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Abstract 
Planners are required to evaluate planning policy instruments to develop a better understanding 
of how they can improve their policy design and implementation processes. Transferable Development 
Rights (TDR) programmes are one of the market-based policy instruments that have attracted 
considerable attention among planners and economists. Given that TDR programmes have been 
introduced as an alternative to traditional regulatory instruments in several jurisdictions on the basis 
that their implementation will result in better policy outcomes, evaluation of these alternative 
programmes is particularly important. Like all policy instruments, the activities concerned with the 
design and implementation of TDR programmes may involve significant transaction costs. These 
activities can be considered as a series of transactions from the perspective of Transaction Cost 
Economics (TCE). While transaction costs are expected to vary across the lifecycle of a policy 
instrument, up to now there have been no systematic research studies concerned with why, and how, 
such transaction costs occur and are distributed among parties involved in different phases of TDR 
programmes. In order to aid better design and implementation of TDR programmes, this paper analyses 
the effects of transaction costs throughout the life of four TDR programmes (Calvert, Montgomery, St. 
Mary’s, and Charles Counties) in the US state of Maryland in order to gain a better understanding of 
the timing and distribution of such costs incurred by different parties involved. 
Keywords: Transferable Development Rights (TDR), Transaction Cost Economics (TCE), 
Planning Policy Instruments, Institutional Design and Arrangements, Policy Lifecycle. 
 
1. Introduction 
Managing the externalities of development is critical in developed and developing countries as 
is ensuring that the costs of environmental preservation are minimised and the benefits of development 
are shared more equitably. Regulatory policy instruments, such as zoning and development control, 
have traditionally been the dominant approach in achieving such planning objectives. Having 
recognised some drawbacks of these instruments, an increasing number of economists/planners have 
been proposing the implementation of market-based instruments (MBIs) (Clinch, O'Neill, & Russell, 
2008; Janssen-Jansen, Spaans, & van der Veen, 2008; Micelli, 2002; Turk & Demircioglu, 2013). MBIs 
change the costs and benefits of agents’ actions by making preferred social and environmental outcomes 
financially more attractive (OECD, 1999). MBIs are arguably more statically (least-cost) and 
dynamically (encourage continuous improvement) efficient and more equitable (due to their 
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redistribution mechanism), and also involve fewer transaction costs compared to traditional regulatory 
instruments (Hahn & Stavins, 1992; Jaffe & Stavins, 1995; Lockie, 2013; Stavins, 2001; Whitten, Van 
Bueren, & Collins, 2003). 
The Transferable Development Rights (TDR) approach is one MBI that has received 
considerable attention in a number of developed and developing countries (Janssen-Jansen et al., 2008; 
Shahab & Azizi, 2013; Spaans, Janssen-Jansen, & van der Veen, 2011; Wang, Tao, Wang, & Su, 2010) 
and has been implemented to address different land preservation/development objectives. Using a 
zoning system, development rights can be transferred from so-called ‘sending areas’ that are less 
desirable for development from a public-policy perspective, to designated areas for development – so-
called ‘receiving areas’. Landowners of sending areas receive payment for the sale of their properties’ 
development rights. Developers may purchase additional development rights from sending areas if they 
wish to develop beyond a specific permitted level in receiving areas (Machemer & Kaplowitz, 2002; 
Nelson, Pruetz, & Woodruff, 2011).  
Some researchers have studied factors affecting TDR success (Aken, Eckert, Fox, & Swenson, 
2008; Chan & Hou, 2015; Kaplowitz, Machemer, & Pruetz, 2008; Machemer & Kaplowitz, 2002; 
Pruetz & Pruetz, 2007). While transaction costs, and other institutional aspects of a policy, can affect 
the efficiency, effectiveness and equity of policy instruments (Buitelaar, 2007; Dawkins, 2000; 
McCann, Colby, Easter, Kasterine, & Kuperan, 2005; Shahab, Clinch, & O’Neill, 2018a), so far, there 
has been little research concerning institutional aspects and related transaction costs of TDR 
programmes. While, in theory, TDR programmes should lead to low transaction costs (Field & Conrad, 
1975; Micelli, 2002), in practice, such transaction costs involving the design and implementation of 
these programmes can be very high (Bruening, 2008; Chomitz, 2004; Messer, 2007; Shahab, Clinch, & 
O’Neill, 2018b) involving costs that vary across time (i.e. the lifecycle of a policy instrument), which 
may also be distributed unevenly among parties (Coggan, Whitten, & Bennett, 2010). 
This paper addresses this issue by analysing the process of designing and implementing TDR 
programmes through the lens of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE). The main objective is to analyse 
when transaction costs arise and by whom such costs are incurred. The paper investigates the effects of 
transaction costs in different phases of designing and implementing TDR programmes, and examines 
the distribution of such costs among different parties. In line with TCE literature, this paper considers 
activities concerned with the design and implementation of TDR programmes as a series of transactions. 
This approach has been used in several other studies (Alexander, 2001a, 2001b; Cho, 2011; Tan, 
Beckmann, Qu, & Wu, 2012; D. B. Thompson, 1999; Whittington & Dowall, 2006), but has not been 
applied in the study of a planning policy instrument, such as TDR. To this end, we briefly review 
previous studies concerning TDR evaluations, as well as the literature on TCE. Then, through 
identifying transactions in the process of designing and implementing TDR programmes, this paper 
analyses the distribution and timing of related transaction costs arising in each phase of this process. 
 
2. Evaluation of Transferable Development Rights (TDR) Programmes 
Since the introduction of TDR programmes in planning in the late 1970s (Renard, 2007), 
researchers have attempted to evaluate these programmes (Aken et al., 2008; Chan & Hou, 2015; 
Kaplowitz et al., 2008; Machemer & Kaplowitz, 2002; McConnell & Walls, 2009; Pruetz & Pruetz, 
2007). A review of this literature shows that most studies have taken a conformance-based evaluation 
approach assessing the degree of conformity between outcomes of an implemented programme and its 
specified objectives (Faludi, 1989; Shahab, Clinch, & O’Neill, 2017). For example, Machemer and 
Kaplowitz (2002) define the degree of success of a programme based on the number of completed TDR 
transactions and the number of acres preserved. This approach has at least two main drawbacks. Firstly, 
the specified policy objectives are not necessarily all the outcomes of a policy (Shahab et al., 2017). 
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While evaluating such criteria is necessary, it is not always sufficient, largely because of side-effects 
(Mickwitz, 2013). Thus, conformance-based evaluation only enables planners to evaluate partial 
outcomes of programmes (i.e. the intended outcomes). Secondly, this approach usually neglects to take 
account of transaction costs, and other institutional aspects, in the design and implementation of 
programmes. This paper focuses on an aspect of the second drawback of the conformance-based 
approach that has, thus far, received little attention in TDR studies, namely, institutional aspects of the 
design and implementation of TDR programmes. 
 
3. Transaction Cost Economics 
As one of the central concepts and significant contributions in New Institutional Economics 
(NIE), ‘transaction costs’ were conceptually introduced by Nobel Laureate Ronald Coase (1937) in his 
seminal paper ‘The Nature of the Firm’ as simply ‘the cost of using the price mechanism’. These costs 
are defined as “all costs other than the costs of physical production” (Lai, 1994, p.84). In TCE, the 
transaction is the ‘basic unit of analysis’ (Williamson, 1998). A transaction can be defined as an 
agreement between two or more parties to exchange goods, services, and payments that can be organised 
in different ways. A transaction is an intention to undertake an ‘action of economic or other value’ 
(Dixit, 1996) where, through a contract, buyers and sellers agree to exchange or provide products, 
properties, services, human resources, and intellectual or other forms of capital.  
While the impact of transaction costs on the efficiency of a policy has been discussed (Buitelaar, 
2007; Dawkins, 2000; Rørstad, Vatn, & Kvakkestad, 2007), there has been limited consideration of the 
distribution of such costs. Transaction costs incurred by the different parties are expected to vary widely 
(Coggan et al., 2010; McCann et al., 2005), according to policy approach and its relevant institutional 
design and arrangement. According to Coggan et al. (2010), the actions and interactions between private 
and public parties can have an upward or downward influence on the significance and distribution of 
transaction costs. Prior research shows that both private and public transaction costs can be significant 
(McCann & Easter, 2000; Mettepenningen, Verspecht, & Van Huylenbroeck, 2009; Rørstad et al., 
2007). Therefore, particular attention should be paid to their distribution among the parties involved. 
Transaction costs include all of the costs associated with the design and implementation of a 
policy instrument and can be decomposed into ex-ante and ex-post transaction costs (Hennart, 1993; 
North, 1990; Williamson, 1985). Ex-ante costs refer to costs that arise before the actual transaction, 
whereas ex-post costs are costs that occur after the transaction. The type, magnitude, and distribution 
of transaction costs associated with policy decision and implementation are not equal for each stage of 
these activities and vary over the lifecycle of a policy (Coggan et al., 2010; Falconer, Dupraz, & Whitby, 
2001). Thus, in order to analyse adequately the transaction costs of TDR programmes, all stages should 
be considered. 
 
4. Methodology 
A case-study methodology was utilised to analyse the process of designing and implementing 
TDR programmes through the lens of TCE. Four TDR programmes in the US state of Maryland were 
selected, including Calvert, Montgomery, St. Mary’s, and Charles Counties (Figure 1). These counties 
are located at different distances from Washington D.C., and experience different levels of development 
pressure. Calvert and Montgomery Counties were initiated in 1979 and 1980, respectively. These 
programmes have been successful in preserving areas that specified for protection (McConnell et al., 
2007; Walls & McConnell, 2007). St. Mary’s and Charles Counties, initiated in the 1990s, are viewed 
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as having been less successful, in that they have preserved limited amounts of land (Dehart & Etgen, 
2007; McConnell et al., 2007).  
 
Figure 1: TDR case-study areas in the State of Maryland, US 
 
 
Semi-structured interviews were used to collect qualitative data from different parties involved 
in the TDR transactions in each TDR case-study area. A semi-structured interview approach was chosen 
as it enabled the tailoring of questions to the participants’ positions, experiences and interview context 
(Galletta, 2013; May, 2011). Interviews were conducted with 46 participants in the four TDR 
programmes between March and July 2016. These key stakeholders included TDR sellers (landowners 
and farmers), TDR buyers (developers), and key personnel from the programme administration and 
planning departments. Since a large number of TDR transactions occurred with the assistance of a land-
use attorney and/or a broker, representatives from these intermediaries were also interviewed (Table 1).  
 
Table 1: Number of stakeholders interviewed in each TDR case study 
 
To ascertain when transaction costs arise, and by whom such costs are incurred, using open-
ended questions, we asked interviewees to guide us through the process as they experienced it. A 
number of subsequent questions were asked to gain a firm understanding of their experiences and the 
process involved. Open-ended questions were asked to provide the maximum flexibility for the 
participants in structuring their comments (Aberbach & Rockman, 2002). Interviews lasted from 45 to 
90 minutes. The authors transcribed the audio-recorded interviews verbatim. In order to analyse the 
interviews, the transactions in the process of designing and implementing TDR programmes were firstly 
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identified in a chronological sequence, as such transactions are the ‘basic unit of analysis’ in TCE. Then, 
using NVivo 11, the interviews were analysed and coded based on the identified transactions. As a 
triangulation technique, the authors reviewed related policy documents and administrative reports, such 
as, the recorded TDR prices and checklists of TDR application requirements. 
 
5. Analysing TDR Programmes through the Perspective of Transaction Cost Economics 
The design and implementation of TDR programmes involve several activities. From the TCE 
perspective, they can be considered as a series of transactions. In order to analyse when transaction 
costs arise and who bears these costs, we break the process of designing and implementing TDR 
programmes into a set of activities and transactions and, for each activity/transaction, corresponding 
transaction costs are identified. These activities are categorised into two stages of policy design and 
policy implementation. Each stage evokes a number of activities and transactions that create transaction 
costs. According to the interviews, the lifecycle of a TDR starts when TDRs are allocated in sending 
and receiving areas and a local ordinance enables landowners to create or certify TDR credits. Then, it 
continues as TDRs are sold or transferred from landowners to developers. Finally, the lifecycle ends by 
TDRs being retired or landed in development projects. The findings of the interviews are synthesised 
in Table 2, whereby we outline the sequence of activities in the TDR design and implementation 
process, together with the transactions which create transaction costs, and the main parties involved. 
Dividing up an activity or transaction might be somewhat problematic as an activity/transaction 
can often be broken up into a further set of activities or transactions (Tan et al., 2012). For example, 
although ‘selling TDRs’, as a whole, can be considered as a single transaction, it can be further sub-
divided into a set of transactions, such as finding a TDR buyer, negotiating a TDR price, and preparing 
a contract. Likewise, ‘finding a TDR buyer’, as a transaction that involves ‘selling TDRs’, may itself 
be further sub-divided into another set of transactions, such as hiring a broker, sharing information and 
consulting with policy administrators. Such division can be continued. In line with Tan et al. (2012), 
this paper decomposes the process of designing and implementing TDR programmes, as far as required, 
in order to address the research questions at hand. 
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Table 2: Activities/transactions in designing and implementing TDR programmes and their related transaction costs 
 
 
5.1. Transaction Costs Involved in TDR Policy Design 
 
5.1.1. Agenda Setting and Policy Selection 
Similar to most planning policies, the TDR design usually starts with agenda-setting. This activity 
involves identifying potential issues and problems (Kingdon, 2003). Then, in order to select the best 
solution to address the identified problems, different policy approaches will be proposed and evaluated. 
The activities of agenda-setting and policy selection in policy design require detailed information 
concerning the problems and alternative policy choices. These activities might be initiated and 
conducted with either a top-down approach or a bottom-up approach. Among the TDR case studies, the 
Calvert County TDR programme has been an example of the latter approach whereby, the TDR 
programme was suggested by the farming community, while the Montgomery County TDR programme 
was initiated based on the former approach, with the programme proposed by the planners. In Calvert 
County, a committee of farmers was established to find alternative farmland-preservation tools for the 
county in 1976. The committee held several meetings with the farmers, landowners, and other 
stakeholders. One of the interviewed committee members stated that “we started collecting information 
and looked at the options, [such as] zoning, easement, scenic easement, TDR, and all these different 
techniques… and finally we convened a meeting of everybody who showed up in a high school 
cafeteria..., and asked everybody:- which technique do you prefer? 75% of the hands said let’s try the 
TDR.” This bottom-up approach decreased the transaction costs of agenda-setting and policy selection 
activities in the Calvert TDR programme, by increasing the credibility of the programme itself, and 
promoting trust among parties involved. 
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Unlike Calvert County, the TDR programme in Montgomery County was suggested by the 
planners and accompanied with large-scale downzoning. The TDR programme and downzoning were 
executed as twin tools to preserve farmlands in Montgomery County, where the TDR programme was 
designed as a compensation mechanism for landowners negatively-affected by downzoning. Whilst the 
TDR programme was effectively operationalised, comparatively, significant resistance was 
encountered. One of the local authorities in Montgomery County highlighted this stating, “the 
Montgomery TDR programme has faced with (sic) a lot of resistance..., even now after more than thirty 
years.” By increasing the time and effort that had to be put in lobbying and negotiating with the 
stakeholders, this resistance increased the transaction costs right from the initial agenda-setting and 
policy selection activities in the Montgomery TDR programme. Apart from the top-down approach, 
downzoning is reported to be one of the main causes of such a resistance from a TCE perspective. While 
downzoning is considered as one of the factors affecting TDR success (Machemer & Kaplowitz, 2002; 
Pruetz & Standridge, 2008), in its execution, it significantly increases the transaction costs of designing 
and implementing TDR programmes. In summary, it was found that research and data collection, the 
analysis associated with defining the problem, lobbying, public participation costs, and the policy 
selection approach, were the main sources of transaction costs in the agenda-setting and policy selection 
activities of the TDR policy design process. The distribution of transaction costs largely depended on 
the policy selection approach; under a top-down approach, such costs are incurred mainly by public 
parties whereas, in a bottom-up approach, they are distributed more equally among the stakeholders, 
both public (planners and policy administrators) and private parties, who voluntarily participated in the 
activities. 
 
5.1.2. Policy Design and Preparation 
After selecting the preferred policy, it needs to be designed and prepared for implementation. 
The design and preparation of TDR programmes are associated with various activities, as outlined in 
Table 2. The first activity, specifying policy objectives, requires data collection and also specific 
knowledge which may create human-capital specificity, as a type of transaction cost. Nonetheless, we 
did not find evidence that such transaction costs are substantial. Among these activities, the designation 
of preservation and development areas, and allocation of TDR credits for them, however, involve 
lengthy negotiations and lobbying that generate considerable transaction costs. For example, one 
interviewee involved in designing the Montgomery TDR programme stated “we had to hold several 
meetings to agree on the sending and receiving areas.” While all interviewees mentioned that they 
believe there is a need to preserve farmland in their counties, reaching a consensus concerning the 
location of development areas, where they can receive additional densities, is more complex. This is 
especially because it can cause a NIMBY1 reaction, such that, even though the residents support the 
general idea, they might oppose the designation of their own neighbourhoods for receiving areas.  
To avoid legal challenges, there is the additional complication that enabling legislation may be 
required for TDR programmes (Machemer & Kaplowitz, 2002) and this may be associated with 
different processes, depending on the type of local government. The counties in the state of Maryland 
have three types of government, including commissioner, charter, and code home-rule. Calvert and St. 
Mary's Counties are run by Commissioners. Montgomery and Charles Counties operate under the 
charter form of government and code home-rule, respectively (Maryland Association of Counties, 
2016). Calvert and St. Mary's Counties were required to go through the state legislation process in order 
                                                     
1. Not In My Back Yard 
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to enact enabling legislation for the TDR programmes. However, the process of enactment of enabling 
legislation for establishing the TDR programmes involved less complexity in Montgomery and Charles 
Counties, where the types of government allow for more local autonomy. Thus, the form of local 
government can have a considerable influence on the magnitude of transaction costs of TDR policy 
design. 
 
5.1.3. Institutional Arrangement 
Before implementing a planning policy, the institutional arrangements for policy need to be 
designed and/or adapted. The institutional arrangements of the TDR programmes are partially designed 
through specifying the sending and receiving areas and allocating TDR credits for them. But such 
arrangements are also associated with hiring and/or training staff, purchasing required equipment, and 
designing the administration process and documents. Prior to implementation, the TDR programmes 
need the designated staff or policy administrators to manage the programme, as well as the design of 
administration process and its related documents. The interviews with policy administrators highlighted 
that the expertise required to perform the TDR programmes are similar to the skills needed to administer 
other preservation programmes. Therefore, the counties normally assigned the duties concerning TDR 
administration to their existing employees and in-house staff. For example, one of the policy 
administrators in Charles County stated “I was already under contract to do other duties for the 
county... [Regarding the TDR administration] I didn't have any special training. I just kind of grew up 
through the process, so it was on-the-job training.” Therefore, it seems that the counties did not incur 
considerable transaction costs regarding the training of staff for administering the TDR programmes. 
The counties usually assign two people to run the TDR programmes; one person responsible for 
the sending areas (or the supply-side of TDR market) and another person responsible for the receiving 
areas (the demand-side of market). Consulting with TDR sellers, reviewing TDR applications, and 
certifying TDRs are the duties of the former administrator, whereas consulting with developers and 
allocating extra densities in receiving areas, based on purchased TDRs, are responsibilities of the latter. 
These two people could be working within the same county department, which is the case in all counties. 
In Montgomery County, however, the Agricultural Services Division of Department of Economic 
Development is mainly responsible for the sending side, while the Planning Department is responsible 
for the receiving side of the programme. Separation of the tasks between different departments makes 
administration process and information collection more time-consuming, compared to other counties, 
and consequently, increases transaction costs. 
In terms of the administration documents, four types of documents are developed for TDR 
transactions, including the TDR certificate, easement (or covenant), deed of transfer, and TDR sale 
contract. TDR certificates vary from comprising only serial numbers, in the case of Montgomery 
County, to being an official document issued by the county, in the cases of Charles and St. Mary’s 
Counties. Both TDR easements/covenants and deed of transfer need to be approved by the county, 
whereas a TDR sale contract is a private sale document between sellers and buyers. All of the TDR 
programmes use standard template documents for the TDR easements/covenants and deed of transfer, 
which can be found on the counties’ websites. This attribute of TDR administration decreases 
transaction costs through making the institutional knowledge gained from one TDR transaction easily 
transferable to other transactions. Finally, local authorities can hold some public TDR educational 
programmes/workshops. While such activities generate considerable transaction costs for planners in 
the policy design stage, they reduce the transaction costs of policy implementation for all parties 
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involved by promoting public awareness, building trust among parties, and decreasing information 
collection costs. 
 
5.2. Transaction Costs Involved in TDR Policy Implementation 
 
5.2.1. Support and Administration 
During the implementation of TDR programmes, the local authorities provide potential TDR 
buyers/sellers with relevant information and administrative support. In this stage, the policy 
administrators are associated with different transactions/activities that generate transaction costs, as 
presented in Table 2. The process of participation in the TDR programmes for landowners and 
developers normally begins with initial consultations. As one of the policy administrators in St. Mary’s 
County pointed out, “the first activity, usually, is an initial consultation that can be a phone call or an 
office meeting.” In such consultations, the administrators may clarify the TDR administration process, 
provide a list of people willing to sell/buy TDRs, suggest some land-use attorneys and brokers, and 
answer any other queries landowners/developers might have. The policy administrators normally 
provide a checklist of activities required. All interviewed policy administrators believed that, because 
of the market-based nature of TDR programmes, the administration of them has been more 
straightforward, and less time-consuming and complicated, in comparison to the other preservation 
policy instruments, such as PDR2 and easement programmes. For example, while a PDR programme 
requires the local authorities to conduct the ‘time-consuming process of valuation’ for the county to 
directly buy development rights from the landowners, in TDR programmes, the prices are set by the 
private market and without direct government interventions. Also, since PDR easements are more 
restrictive than TDR ones, they require more frequent and time-consuming monitoring and inspection. 
Thus, the market-based approach of TDR programmes decreases the transaction costs of policy 
implementation for the policy administrators. 
The time and effort that has to be put into reviewing preservation/development applications 
depends on the policy design and administration process. Regarding the preservation applications, the 
policy administrators need to determine the eligibility and availability of TDRs in sending areas. 
Calvert, Montgomery, and St. Mary's Counties have simplified the administration process by specifying 
the number of acres required to create a single TDR. The landowners in these counties can create a 
single TDR per one, five, and three acres, respectively, from the properties located in the sending areas. 
In Charles County the number of eligible TDRs of lands in sending areas is based on soil, size, and 
location criteria. By increasing uncertainties, administration costs, and information collection costs, this 
regulation increases transaction costs of both policy administrators and landowners in Charles County, 
compared to other case studies. Determining applicable number of TDRs in development projects will 
be discussed in the TDR retirement section. 
 
5.2.2. TDR Creation 
The creation of TDRs is the first step for those landowners interested in participating in the TDR 
programme, and selling the TDRs of their properties. TDR creation refers to the process of certifying 
TDRs extracted from a sending site and preparing them for transfer and change of ownership. During 
                                                     
2. Purchase of Development Rights 
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the process required to create TDRs, landowners, and sometimes developers, are involved with some 
transactions, such as hiring a land-use attorney, preparing a title report, preparing a land survey, and 
applying for TDR certificates. As part of a TDR application, the counties require a title report, and 
sometimes a land survey. A title report shows the history of a property in terms of its ownerships, 
easements, mortgages, and other rights and regulations concerning the property. A land survey refers 
to the measurement and mapping of a property in terms of its acreage, location, and boundaries. 
Preparation of these documents requires hiring a land-use attorney and a land surveyor. The land-use 
attorney is hired directly by the landowner. The land surveyor is hired either by the landowner or on 
their behalf by the land-use attorney, as part of their contract. The costs of preparing title reports and 
land surveys vary but are normally within the range of $500-$1500 for the title report and $10,000-
$15,000 for the land survey3. These costs are considered as the main transaction costs in the process of 
TDR creation. 
Some landowners and developers questioned the necessity of the land survey as a requirement 
for TDR creation, given that it creates considerable transaction costs. For example, one landowner in 
Montgomery County argued: “I think [preparing] a survey is not necessary. You know the acreage of 
the entire county and if this parcel is 5 acres bigger than it supposed to be, somebody’s parcel is around 
5 acres smaller. So overall it'll all average itself out eventually.” Although such costs are normally 
incurred by the landowners, when there are high demands for TDRs, the TDR sellers have higher 
bargaining power in negotiations with buyers over TDR prices and their associated costs. Depending 
on market conditions, and the agreement between buyers and sellers, these costs can be incurred by 
either or both parties. One of the developers in St. Mary’s County pointed out that “even though the 
landowner incurs those costs, as a developer, obviously I'm going to pay more for the TDRs, because 
the landowner had to pay those expenses... costs get passed along to the end user.” In summary, the 
transaction costs of TDR-creation transactions can be significant and are mainly incurred by the 
landowners and developers involved in the TDR transactions. 
 
5.2.3. Contracting 
After creating TDRs, landowners are required to find a buyer for their TDRs and complete the 
transfer. The important transactions here are finding a TDR seller or buyer, collecting information from 
policy administrators and intermediaries, hiring a broker and paying a brokerage commission, 
negotiating a TDR price, preparing a contract, and payment. One of the main sources of transaction 
costs for the sellers of TDRs is uncertainty surrounding how to find a buyer for their TDRs. All of the 
counties provide some information, available for TDR buyers, about potential TDR sellers. In Charles 
County, there is an online list of people who have TDRs certified. Other counties maintain a list of 
individuals, available upon request, who have TDRs for sale. However, no listing of potential buyers is 
made available. Thus, it is much easier to find a TDR seller than a buyer. There is no source to find the 
TDR buyers, other than ‘word of mouth’ and/or the use of intermediaries such as brokers and land-use 
attorneys. One of the farmers in Montgomery County, pointed out “I think there could be a better 
platform, like an online website, where it's not only word of mouth. Not just you know a guy, he knows 
a guy. Some kind of database platform set up where developers can go in there and you can look at it. 
They can say I'm looking for this amount of TDRs, who in the county has them.” This uncertainty over 
finding a buyer for TDRs increases overall transaction costs of TDR sellers, in comparison to the costs 
incurred by the TDR buyers. 
                                                     
3. As of June 2016 
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Negotiations over TDR prices are associated with high levels of uncertainty, thereby increasing 
transaction costs for the parties involved in the transaction. Information asymmetries, opportunism, and 
substantial TDR-price fluctuations are the main sources of uncertainties in the TDR transactions. 
Because of their past experiences and personal connections, developers usually have better access to 
relevant data and information concerning the TDR prices, compared to farmers and landowners. Such 
information asymmetries provide potential for rent-seeking and opportunistic behaviours. As the TDR 
prices are mainly driven by the housing and development market, their fluctuations have been 
significant in the TDR case studies during the years of their initiation, with the exception of Calvert 
County. For example, the TDR price in Charles County was $10,000 per TDR in 2005, while, one year 
later in 2006, the price was as high as $20,000 per TDR. Again, mainly because of economic and 
financial crisis of 2008, the price of $19,500 per TDR in that year dramatically dropped and traded for 
$5,000 per TDR in 2009. Finally, the parties involved in TDR transactions normally use some 
‘boilerplate’ templates to prepare such contracts. Thus, preparing a contract between sellers and buyers 
of TDRs is a straightforward activity which is not associated with considerable transaction costs. 
 
5.2.4. TDR Retirement 
The last step in the lifecycle of TDRs is their retirement, which refers to the process of landing 
(i.e. permanently assigning) them in areas designated for development. When TDRs are created and 
transferred to developers, they can use them as allowances for extra densities in their development 
projects located in receiving areas, subject to gaining the approval of planners. In Calvert, Charles, and 
St. Mary’s Counties, the use of purchased TDRs in the receiving areas is ‘by right’, which means the 
developers do not have to negotiate over the use of density with TDRs and can build at the level 
specified in the zoning ordinance. In Montgomery County, the density is subject to negotiation with the 
county planning administration and/or public hearings on development, even with TDRs being specified 
in the zoning ordinance. Developers in this county are faced with uncertainty over the development 
density outcomes, notwithstanding their TDR purchase. This attribute of Montgomery County increases 
transaction costs of the developers through an uncertain and lengthy development review process. This 
difference between Montgomery County and other case studies lies behind their different locations, 
scales, and, consequently, approaches toward future development. An important contrasting 
characteristic of the other three counties is that they are mainly rural, and tend to have a positive outlook 
towards development. Whereas Montgomery County, having more urbanised areas with a population 
approximately three times more than all the other three counties collectively, has stricter development 
policies. 
 
5.2.5. Policy Evaluation 
Evaluation is an essential part of the policy design and implementation process. All counties have 
conducted a number of ongoing evaluations after the initiation of programmes. These aim to assess the 
effectiveness of the programme, and to monitor the TDR market, in general, and the balance of TDR 
supply and demand, in particular and have led to some major changes in the design and implementation 
of all TDR case-study programmes. For example, St. Mary’s County programme evaluations resulted 
in three major changes in 1999, 2002, and 2006. The county amended the zoning ordinance in order to 
increase the demand for TDRs and simplified the administration process by removing some TDR 
application requirements, such as the land survey. Transaction costs of TDR evaluation activities are 
comparable with those concerning the TDR policy design, discussed above. Such activities require 
12 
 
significant information collection and negotiations, which are the main sources of transaction costs in 
TDR evaluation. In the case of St. Mary’s County TDR programme, a taskforce that formed to evaluate 
the programme held several meetings over two years. Similar to the TDR policy design activities, the 
distribution of such costs depends on the policy evaluation and policy change approach; whether it uses 
a bottom-up or a top-down approach. Table 3 outlines the key findings concerning each category of 
activities in the process of designing and implementing TDR case-study programmes and their related 
transaction costs. 
 
Table 3: Key findings concerning each TDR programme and types of influence on transaction costs 
 
(+) upward influence on transaction costs, (-) downward influence on transaction costs, comparatively 
 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
Managing the externalities of development is critical in developed and developing countries. In 
analysing policy instruments, policy analysts often use efficiency and equity as evaluation criteria 
noting the importance of minimising the costs of environmental preservation and ensuring the benefits 
of development are shared more equitably. Presented by new institutional economists, transaction costs 
are one of the influencing factors on both the efficiency and equity of policy instruments. Positive 
transaction costs reduce the efficiency of a policy and as such costs are usually distributed unequally 
among different private and public parties involved, they can have a considerable impact on the equity 
of any policy. Despite their introduction into the planning literature, transaction costs have yet to be 
fully examined in terms of the process of designing and implementing planning policy instruments. 
Through analysing four TDR case-study programmes, this article contributes to the planning literature 
by presenting a way that policy-related transaction costs can be analysed systematically through a 
framework informed by TCE. Importantly, this paper argues that gaining a better understanding of when 
transaction costs arise, and who bears these costs, enables planners to design and implement policy 
instruments in a more efficient and equitable manner. This has the potential to aid policy design and 
implementation; also enabling the transfer of policy design lessons to other developed and developing 
countries adopting such programmes. 
The design and implementation of the TDR programmes consist of different 
activities/transactions that generate transaction costs (as we outline in Table 2). The process of 
designing TDR programmes involves three categories of activities, including agenda-setting and policy 
selection, policy design and preparation, and institutional arrangement. Among the identified 
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transactions of TDR policy design activities, two transactions are associated with notable transaction 
costs; first, calling for public meetings, hearings and votes in the agenda-setting and policy selection; 
second, modifying existing zoning ordinance along with downzoning. Although public involvement 
and participation increases the transaction costs of the activities concerning TDR policy design, it can 
decrease such costs in the process of TDR implementation through increasing the credibility of a 
programme, raising public awareness, and building trust among parties involved. On the other hand, 
downzoning is politically unpopular, whereby it generates resistance against the design and 
implementation of the TDR programmes.  
The TDR-implementation stage is classified into five categories of activities, including support 
and administration, TDR creation, contracting, TDR retirement, and policy evaluation. While the 
transaction costs of activities associated with support and administration and policy evaluation are 
mainly incurred by public parties, the transaction costs of TDR creation, contracting, and TDR 
retirement, are largely incurred by private parties. The main sources of transaction costs in the TDR-
creation activities are fulfilling the TDR administration requirements, such as preparing the title report 
and land survey. Uncertainties surrounding TDR prices, and finding TDR buyers, create substantial 
transaction costs in the activities associated with contracting. Finally, subsequent to purchasing TDRs, 
the main source of transaction costs in the TDR retirement stage results from the need for further 
negotiation with the county, and associated public hearings, for obtaining extra density to be used in 
the development projects. The use of purchased TDRs ‘by right’ decreases the transaction costs of 
developers. 
In terms of the distribution of transaction costs, the results of this study show that such costs vary 
across time, as well as among parties involved in different stages. While public parties associate with 
high transaction costs in the TDR policy-design stage, their costs are not reported to be substantial in 
the TDR policy-implementation stage. Due to the market-based nature of TDR programmes, transaction 
costs arising from their implementation are largely incurred by private parties, rather than public parties. 
In order to find a buyer/seller for TDRs, and to understand what the current TDR sale price is, the TDR 
sellers/buyers are heavily reliant on their personal relationships. This relational form of transaction can 
have an upward effect on transaction costs by increasing uncertainties and information-collection costs. 
However, such transaction costs incurred by developers are reported to be fewer in comparison to those 
of landowners because they usually have better access to relevant information through personal 
connections and past experiences. Along with timing and distributional aspects of transaction costs in 
the design and implementation of policy instruments, measuring the magnitude of such costs can be of 
significant importance. While it was beyond the objectives of the current paper, we suggest that such 
measurement would be a fruitful and helpful area for further research. 
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